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Abstract
Nash equilibria for strategic gamces u~ere characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996)
as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and
one-person rationality.
There are other solutions, like the e-Nash equilibria, uhich enjoy nice proper-
ties and appear to be interesting sv,bstitutes for Nash equilibria urhen their e~istence
cannot 6e guaranteed. They can 6e characterized using an appropriate substitute
of one-person rationality. Afore generally, u~e introduce the class of "personalized"
Nash equilibria and u~e proue that it contains all of the solutions characterized by
consistency and conuerse consistency.
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11 Introduction
The starting point for this work was an attempt to see whether the axiomatizations for
Nash equilibria given in Peleg and Tijs (1996) and in Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996), could
be adapted to get axiomatizations for e-equilibria also.
In Peleg and Tijs (1996) it was proved that (OPR) (One Person Rationality), (CONS)
(Consistency) and (COCONS) (Converse Consistency) can be used to provide an axiomatic
characterization for Nash equilibria (briefly: NE). We refer to that paper for motivation
and references to related work. Further references, in which the above mentioned results
have been extended, are: Norde, Potters, Reijnierse and Vermeulen (1996), Peleg and
Sudhdlter (1994) and Shinotsuka (1994).
Looking for a characterization of E-NE, it was clear that the key point was to replace
(OPR) by (E-OPR). By (OPR}, in Peleg and Tijs (1996) it was named the requirement that
for 1-person games the solution to be characterized coincides with payoff maximization.
Clearly, (e-OPR) should mean that for 1-person games we look for e-maximizers instead
of maximizers.
Being interested also in other kinds of appro3cimate NE, like the (e-k)-NE introduced
in Lucchetti. Patrone and Tijs (1986), and studied also in Jurg and Tijs (1993) and Norde
and Potters (1995), we looked at a unified way to achieve this kind of axiomatic charac-
terizations.
The solution is simple: it is sufficient to introduce a(possibly personalized) "choice
rule" p for all of the potential players, and to substitute a conveniently defined (7~-OPR)
for (OPR). In this way, we get the axiomatic characterizations of NE and of the various
kinds of approximate NE in which we were interested: the distinction between the various
solution concepts is simply done by means of an appropriate choice of the choice rules p.
To be more detailed, by means of a set P of choice rules p we define P-NE. Then,
P-NE is characterized by (P- OPR), (CONS) and (COCONS). Furthermore, it is proved
that under mild conditions every solution satisfying (CONS) and (COCONS) is in fact a
P-NE, for an appropriate family ~ of choice rules p: so, P-NE appear to be all of the
2solutions which can be considered if we want to respect consistency (direct and converse).
Also a characterization of ~-NE is provided by means of (~-OPR), (NEI`1) (non
emptiness) and (CONS), along the lines of Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996).
2 P-Nash equilibria
The main tool to define ~-NE is the "choice rule" that was mentioned in the introduction.
Actually, it will be assumed that different players may have different choice rules: i.e.,
we are prepared to consider "personalized" choice rules, which is reflected in the name of
~-NE.
Definition 2.1 A choice rule is a pair (U, p), where:
- U is a nonempty set of real valued functions
- p is a map that to every u E U, u: A-~ R, associates a subset p(u) of A.
Remark 2.1 We (implicitly) assume that every function u E U is defined on a nonempty
set. We do not assume that p(u) ~ 0. -
The definition says, in words, that the rule (U,p) "chooses", for a given function u,
a subset of A, the domain of u. Usually, we shall refer to the rule simply by p. The set U
will be called the domain of the rule.
For ease of reference, we shall use also the notation p(A, u), where A stands for the
domain of the function u. Clearly superfluous, but useful to give "a name" to the domain
of u.
Before providing some examples, we introduce the following compatibility condition:
Definition 2.2 The choice rule (U, p) satisfies the compatibility condition if..
given (A. u) and (B, v), s.t. u, v E U and A, B are their respective
(CC) ~ domains, assume that táere is a bijection f: A--~ B s.t. v o f- u:
! t6en, p(v) - f(P(u)).
Clearly condition (CC) excludes a too wild behavior for the choice rule: it means
a sort of "independence of irrelevant details", and will provide to be very useful in the
characterizations we shall prove in the following sections.
3Notice that (CC) has nothing to do with utility transformations that leave the pref-
erences unaffected. About preferences, let us point out that we could have considered
choice rules based on preferences, instead of (utility) functions: however, for definiteness,
we shall not pursue this point of view.
Example 2.1 In the cases (a)-(g), there is no particular restriction on the choice of the
domain U for p. For definiteness, one could think of U as being Up, the set of all real-valued
functions defined on all finite sets.
(a) p(A, u) - argmaxAu
(b) p(A,u) - A
(c} p(A, u) -{a E A: u(a) ) supA u- E}, where e 1 0 is given, independent of u
(d) p(A, u) -{a E A: u(a) ~ k}, where k E R is given, independent of u
(e) p(A, u) -{a E A: u(a) ~ supA u- e or u(a) ~ k}, where e and k are as before
(f) p(A, u) -{a E A: u(a) - max,q u, if any; else u(a) ~ supA u- e, if any; else u(a) )
k}, where ~ and k are as before
Notice that, for e) 0, in (e) and (f) we have p(A, u) ~ 0 for every u E U (also for
u ~ uF)
(g) p(A, u) -{a E A: u(a) is an even integer }
(h) Assume U - UF:
p(A. u) -{a E A: u(a) is equal to the mean value of u}
(i) Assume U is the set of all real valued functions defined on subsets of N:
p(A.u)- {aEA: a iseven} -
It should be clear that in the examples (a)-(h) condition (CC) is satisfied, while this
is not true for (i). Notice that in examples (b) and (i) p depends actually only on the
domain of the function u.
Now we are ready to give the definition of P-NE. Let G-(N, (AZ);EN, (ui);E,v) be a
(finite person) game in strategic form: N is the set of players, and will be assumed to be
finite; A; is the strategy space of player i E N and u; : A-~ R is the payoff for player i,
4where A - ~1~.v A,.
Definition 2.3 Let G be as above. Assume that for every i E N it is given a choice rule
(U;,p;). Let á-(á.;);-.ti- E A. Define A; - A, x{á-;} and let u; be u;~A,. Assume that
(2.1) u; E U; for every i E N
We shall say that á is a P-NE if á, E p;(Á;, u;) for every i E N.
Remark 2.2 As usual á-, denotes the element á from which it has been deleted the i-th
coordinate, so that (slight abuse of notation) á-(á.;,á-;). Notice that, when N-{io},
Á;o - A;o - A. p
Remark 2.3 There is another way to define P-NE, as pointed out by Norde. Given á E A,
define u; : A; ~ R by u;(a;) - u;(a;,á-;), and assume that u; E U; for every i E N.
Then, á is a P-NE if á E p;(A;, v,;) for every i E N. Following this approach, which is also
coherent with the definition of reduced game (see Definition 3.1), one can get rid of (CC).
Doing so, one should be careful not to confuse u; with u;, since the "preferred elements"
chosen by means of p; need not to be the same. V
Example 2.2 Let G be a game. If the class U is conveniently chosen (e.g.: it contains all of
the u; and all of their restrictions to subsets of A, so that condition (2.1) is satisfied), then
P-NE corresponding to the case in which all of the players use the choice rule described
in (a) of Example 2.1 are just the Nash equilibria, while the case in which all use the rule
(c) gives rise to e-NE. -,
Example 2.3 Let G be a semi-infinite bimatrix game. Assume that U is chosen as in the
previous example. Then, the definition of weakly determined game, given in Lucchetti,
Patrone and Tijs (1986), can be given using the rules described in cases (c) and (d) of
Example 2.1. The results established in Jurg and Tijs (1993) and Norde and Potters
(1995) can be rephrased saying that the games considered there have a P-NE for every
e~ 0 and k E R, where:
- player I uses the rule given in (a)
5- player II uses the rule given in (e)
Example 2.4 In the game given by the following table, (T, L) is the unique P-NE (we
consider only pure strategies), if both players adopt the rule described in Example 2.1,
(g)-
I `II ! L R
I T ~ (0, -2) , (2. 1)
~ B ~ (1, 0) ', (1, 1)
u
Notice that in Example 2.3 the players use different rules. Another obvious instance
of this is the case of a saddle point: it is a~-NE for a game where both players look at
the same payoff function, but player I maximizes and player II minimizes.
3 Consistency and converse consistency
Let G- (N. (A,);;.~.. (ut);~.ti-) be a game. Let S C N, S ~{0, N} and ~-(i;)~c.ti. E A.
We shall say that GsÍ -(S. (A;)ies, (ui);-s) is the reduced ame of G, w.r.t. S and ~, if
u; : As -~,-s A; ---~ R is defined as follows:
u~ (Ys) - ut(ys.~.~-`s)
Definition 3.1 Let C be a class ofgames. We shall say that G is closed under reduction
if the following holds:
(CLOS) for every G-(N, (A;)~e.ti., (u,);~,ti-) E 9, for every x E A and for every
Ss.t. SCN,S~{0.N},wehaveGsÍE~.
Definition 3.2 Given a class ~ of games, we shall say that o is a solution (on ~) if, for
every G-(N, (A;);F.~;, (u;);EN) E~, it is b(G) C A.
Wé shall say that a solution y5 satisfies consistency if..
i for every G E~, for every i E A and for every S( S C N, S~{0, N})
(CONS) ! s.t. Gs~Í E C~; -
~ (if i E 4(G), then xs E~(Gs.Z)f
6We say that a solution o, defined on a class G of games satisfying (CLOS), satisfies
converse consistencv if..
(COCONS) I for every G E G s.t. card(N) ~ 2, and for every x S A:
~ ~if, for every S s.t. S C N. S~{0. N}, ~s E o(G ), then ~ E o(G)).
It is now time to introduce (P-OPR). Before doing so, we shall put some restrictions
on the class of games that we consider.
We shall assume that there is given ~1~, a set of potential players, and that for every
i E N there is given a choice rule (U„ p;).
We shall consider classes of games G s.t. for every G - (N, (A;);EN, (v,;)iE,v) E 9,
N C ~~V.
On such classes of games, we shall say that a solution ~ satisfies personalized one-
person rationality if the following holds:
(P-OPR) ~ for every i E N, and for every game G- ({i}, A, u) E Q we have that
u E U; and q(G) - p;(A, u)
Vl'e can now state the following
Theorem 3.1 Let Q be a class ofgames satisfying (CLOS). Assume that, for every i E.1~,
the choice rule satisfies (CC). Assume, moreover, that for every G E~ and for every á E A
it is satisfied condition (2.1) of Definition 2.3.
Then, a solution o on C ~ is the P-NE if and only if o satisfies ('P-OPR), (CONS) and
(COCONS).
It is straightforward to verify that P-NE satisfies (P-OPR), (CON5) and (COCONS).
Notice that, to achieve (CONS) and (COCONS), conditions (CLOS) and (2.1) guarantee
that the appropriate choice rules can be applied; while (CC) implies that the choice rules
work in an appropriate way.
For the converse, the key argument is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let Q be a family ofgames satisfying (CLOS). Let ~1, yh2 be solutions on ~
s.t. ~,1 satisfies (P-OPR) and (CONS), while tfi2 satisfies (P-OPR) and (COCONS). Then,
~~ ~ 42.
7Proof of Theorem 3.1. Since P-NE satisfies all of the three properties, this Lemma gives
us, for b in Theorem 3.1, both 4 C ~-NE and P-NE C p. Hence, the proof of Theorem
3.1. -~ ~
Proof of Lemma 3.1. By induction on the number of players. For card(N) - 1, it is
guaranteed by (P-OPR); we have even equality of the sets.
Assume that ~1(H) C 4z(H) for every game H s.t. card(N(H)) C k. We shall prove
that for every game G s.t. card(N(G)) - k-}- 1 we have ~1(G) C~z(G).
Let i E~1(G). By (CLOS), Gs~i E 9 for every S s.t. S C N, S~{0, N}. By
(CONS), xs E ~1(Gs~2). So, by the induction hypothesis, ~1(GS~Í) C~2(Gs.z). But
(COCONS) guarantees that i E~z(G). p
The proofs of Theorem 3.1 and of Lemma 3.1 show that (P-OPR) lies, so to say,
in the background. It has some kind of parametric róle. In other words, everything is
pointing to the fact that a solution satisfying (CONS) and (COCONS) should be some
kind of P-NE.
Actually, the following result is an instance of the principle sketched above. It is
stated in a special class to avoid too many technical details. Furthermore, we shall confine
to solutions and choice rules which satisfy a compatibility condition. This condition is
essentially the same for both. To be more precise, for the solution o we shall ask for the
following property, that is essentially an adaptation of (CC) for games.
Definition 3.3 Given a class ~ of games, and a solution o on ~, we shall say táat
satisfies the compatibilitv condition if..
~ given G - (N. (At)t~.ti-, (u~)te:~~) E ~ and H - (N. (B:)te:`., (v~)~e.~') E ~,
'i if
( for every i E N táere is a bijection f, : A; -~ Bi s.t. for every j
~CCÍ~ I v)(fl(al)~...,fi(ai),....fN(Q.b')) - ~J(Ql,....a{,...,a.v)Ji
i then:
( (ál, . . . , át, . . . , áN ) E ~(G) if and only if
(fl(Q1), . . . , fi(a,i), . . . i fN(áN)) E Gh(H) J.
0
Notice that G and H have the same set of players. Apart from this fact that we just
stressed, condition (CC7) is far from being new. It can be found, e.g., in Rosenthal (1974).
8Furthermore, condition (CC7) is satisfied by all of the main solutions concepts for
strategic games (NE, correlated equilibria, ~-NE, perfect equilibria, etc.)
Example 3.1 Consider the following two games:
í I `II , L ; C
T ~ (2, 2) I (1,1)
M I (1,1) (1,1)





1 `II ' l; ~ ~
n 3,0) , (2,2) (1,1)
~3 (5,3) (0,5) (1,4)
ry (4,1) ( 1,1) I (1.1~1
We have:
fi(T) - a..fr(~1) - 7.Ír(B) - :3
.fir(L) - rl, Ïrr(C) - ~, frr(R) - ~
And so, since (T. L) and (Al, C) are NE for G, (a,rl) and (7. ~) are NE for H. ~
Theorem 3.2 Let C~be the class of all finite games s.t. N C.1~. Let o be a solution on
C~, satisfying (CONS) and (COCONS).
Ifo satis6es (CC~), then b determines, by one-person games, a uniaue family of choice
rules (pt)t.,ti- defined on ZlF and satisfying (CC). llloreover, ó is the T-NE determined by
these choice rules.
Proof. Let i E.1~, A be a finite set and let u: A-~ R. Define p;(A, u) - q({i}, A, u).
Such p; satisfies (CC).
By definition of p;, clearly ~ satisfies (P-OPR) w.r.t. this family of choice rules.
Since by assumption ~ satisfies also (CONS) and (COCONS), thanks to Theorem
3.1 we have that cy - ~-NE. p
9Let us notice at this point that, since perfect NE do not satisfy (CONS), they cannot
be ~-NE. The same is true for other refinements of NE which do not satisfy (CON5): see
Example 2.4 of Peleg and Tijs (1996).
One word on the independence of the properties (P-OPR), (CONS) and (COCONS).
Again, examples 2.16 and 2.17 from Peleg and Tijs (1996) show that neither (CONS) nor
(COCONS) are implied by the other two. For what concerns (P-OPR), the previous
Theorem gives an answer (at least under the compatibility conditions). Let us notice that
for the solution ~ provided in Peleg and Tijs to show that (OPR) is not implied by (CONS)
and (COCONS), we have actually that ~- P-NE, for p given as in Example 2.1 (b).
Referring to Peleg and Tijs (1996) once more, we point out that it is possible to extend
to this setting also their results on the extensive form games: in particular, defining P-SPE
(that is, P-subgame perfect equilibrium).
We end this section providing an example of a solution which is not a~-NE. This
solution could be seen as a refinement of the (~-k)-NE which correspond to the P-NE
induced by the choice rule described in Example 2.1 (e).
Example 3.2 Let be given e~ 0 and k E N, k ) 1. Given G- (N, (A;);~.~.. ( ut)~-y), we
define
o(G) -{{á : for every i E N.ut(á) ~ sup,t,u,(a.t.á-;) - s}r ui(á) ) k)} therwise.ty,
We provide a counterexample to show that o does not satisfy (CONS).
Let N-{I, II. III}; A-{T, B} x N x N; u1(x. y, z) -{ 1 if ~ - T and y- 1
0 otherwise
J1 ifx-T
un (~~ y, x) - l y if ~- B ; uiii (~, y, z) - z.
Clearly ~- (B, k, k) is in o(G) (notice that [he payoff of III prevents the existence
of F-NE).
However, for the reduced game GS~~, with S-{LII}, (B,k) ~ o(Gsr), because
GS~~ has a NE (the point (T.1)). G
104 The ancestor property
Given a class C~ of games and a solution v on G, Peleg, Potters and Tijs ( 1996) have
introduced a directed graph; denoted by Graph(G, p), whose vertices are couples (G, x)
with G E G and x E 4(G).
Two nodes (H, y) and (K, z) in the graph are connected if K is a reduced game of
H, given y. That is:
N(K) C N(H), N(K) ~{0, N(H)}
I{ - HN(K)~y
z - y~N(!f)
Also the following property was introduced in Peleg, Potters and Tijs ( 1996).
Definition 4.1 The graph Graph(G, o) has the ancestor property if..
(AP)
for every (G. x) E Graph(~, ó), there is a game H E~ s.t. for every
y E o(H) the vertex (H, y) is connected with (G. x).
It is easy to notice that Theorem 1 of Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996) holds also if we
drop any reference to (OPR). That is, we can prove the following theorem. Before that,
a piece of notation: if a solution o on a class G is nonempty valued, we shall say that ó
satisfies (NEAI).
Theorem 4.1 Let C be a dass ofgames, and let o be a solution on ~. satisfying (NElli)
and (CONS).
If o is a solution on G which satisfies (AP), then o is minimal (on G, w.r.t. inclusion)
in the ctass of solutions on Q which satisfy (NEhT) and (CONS).
Proof. Let o be given, which satisfies (NEI~I) and (CONS), s.t. o C ó. We shall prove
that ~ - o.
Let G E G and x E q(G). Consider H, whose existence is guaranteed by (AP). We
have, for (NEM), that q(H) ~ 0. So, let y E~(H). Now, y~N(~) E~(H"-(c)~y) by (CONS)
applied to ó. But y E d(H), hence y E 4(H). So, y~,ti.(~) - x by (AP).
11Hence, we have proved that x E~i(H'ti~~~l~y), but H`ti~l~l~y - G by the defin.ition of
Graph(G. o). ~
Now, we can prove the following result, which extends to P-NE the considerations
made by Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996) after their Theorem 1.
Theorem 4.2 Let Q be a class ofgames satisfying (CLOS) and s.t. ~-NE satisfies (NE111)
and (AP) on C.
Ifq is a solution on G that satisfies (NEM), (CONS) and ('P-OPR), then o - P-NE.
Proof. Since ~ satisfies (P-OPR) and (CONS), while P-NE satisfies (P-OPR) and
(COCONS), we have that ~ C P-NE by Lemma 3.1.
But P-NE on G satisfies (CONS) and (NEh1). Since we assumed also that P-NE
satisfies (AP) on C, thanks to Theorem 4.1 we can conclude that P-NE is minimal on Q
w.r.t. (NEh~) and (CONS). So, P-NE - q o
We shall now see how to extend Theorem 3-a of Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996). To
simplify, we shall assume that every player in .1( has its choice rule with domain U~. We
shall, furthermore, assume that all of these rules satisfy (CC). We need a further restriction
on these rules.
Definition 4.2 A choice rule (U, p) is said to separate points if..
(SP)
there exist 3.~ E R s.t. for every function u: S2 --~ R(u E U) s.t.
u(S2) - {3. ~}, it is p(S2. u) -{w E f2 : u(w) - 7}
The idea behind this definition is clear. Let us add that (SP) is not very useful
without (CC). Referring to Example 2.1, notice that on UF rules (a), (c), (d), (e), (f) and
(g) satisfy (5P), while the rules (b) and (h) do not. All of them satisfy (CC). For rule
(c), when e~ 0, it is sufficient to take ;3 - 0 and -y - 2e. Notice that the functions
u considered in (SP) fail to be continuous on "nice" topological spaces (e.g., an interval
of the reals), so that this road is barred if one is interested in extending the result that
we shall give to a context like those studied in Peleg and Sudhólter (1994) or in Norde,
Potters, Reijnierse and Vermeulen (1996).
12Let us prove our result:
Theorem 4.3 Let be given an infinite set .V of potential players. Assume that for every
i E.ti~ we are given a choice rule (U;, p~) s.t. U, - UF and satisfying (CC) and (SP).
Let C-~1~~-~ti~E be the class of all finite games, with players in .~, which have
P-NE.
Then, P-NE satisfies (AP) on ~.
Proo . Let (G, i) E G. We shall essentially repeat the construction in Peleg, Potters and
Tijs ( 1996) of a game H to prove (AP).
We add one player to N(G). Take a player j E JV s.t. j~ N. So, N(H) - N(G)U{j}.
The strategy spaces of H are: for i E N(G), At is as in G. For player j, A~ -{T, B}.
The payoff functions are defined as follows:
for player j:
U,(~. B) - ~;
Z~ (~. T) - ~~




Z-;(x.T) - .3Z if xt ~ ~t
L-t(x.T) - 7~ if x~ - ~z
It can be verified that (x, B) is the uniaue P-NE for H (the arguments are as in Peleg,
Potters and Tijs (1996)). So, H E~~~T-.r~E. It is straightforward to see that (~, B) ~-~G~ - i
and that H-~~~c~ li,el - G „
13REFERENCES
Jurg P and Tijs SH (1993) On the Determinateness of Semi-Infinite Bimatri~ Games,
Internat. J. Game Theory, 21, 361-369.
Lucchetti R, Patrone F and Tijs SH (1986) Determinateness of tu,~o-person games, Boll.
Un. h1at. Ital. B(7), 5-B, 907-924.
Norde H and Potters J(1995) On the Determinateness of m x oo-Bimatria Games,
preprint.
Norde H, Potters J, R.eijnierse H and Vermeulen D(1996) Equilibrium Selection and
Consistency, Games and Economic Behavior, 12, 219-225.
Peleg B, Potters J and Tijs SH (1996) Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic
games, in particular for potential games, Economic Theory, 7, 81-93.
Peleg B and Tijs SH (1996) The Consistency Principle For Games in Strategic Form,
Internat. J. Game Theory, 25, 13-34.
Peleg B and Sudhdlter P(1994) An Aaiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic
Sítuations, preprint.
Rosenthal R~';' (1974) Correlafed Equilibria in Some Classes of Tu;o-Person Games,
Internat. J. Game Theory, 3, 119-128.
Shinotsuka T(1994) An A.ziomatization oJNash Equilibria in Economíc Situations:
The Infinite Dimensional Case. preprint.
14i
IN 1995 REEDS VERSCHENEN
684 Paul Smit
The Approximation of an Eigenvector by Ritzvectors
Communicated by Prof.dr. M.H.C. Paardekooper
685 Harry Webers
The generalized circular model
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
686 Laurence A.G.M. van Lent
Pressure and Politics in Fínancial Accounting Regulation
Communicated by Prof.drs. G.G.M. Bak RA
687 B. de Rooij en G.J. van der Pijl
A contingency approach to Quality System Implementation
Communicated by Prof.dr.ir. C.A.Th. Takkenberg
688 Edwin R. van Dam en Willem H. Haemers
Graphs with constant p and p
Communicated by Prof.dr. S.H. Tijs
689 G. Facchini, F. van Megen, P. Borm and S. Tijs
Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
690 Jos Grazell en Chris Veld
Alternatieve Perspectieven in de Theorie van de Ondernemingsfinanciering
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.W. Moerland
691 Gert Hegge en Rezaul Kabir
Een nadere analyse van de relaties tussen aandelenrendementen en winsten,
dividenden en cash-flows
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.W. Moerland
692 P. Jean-Jacques Herings
On the Representation of Admissible Rationing Schemes by Rationing Functions
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
693 P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Rigidity of Prices, the Generic Case?
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
694 Laurence A.G.M. van Lent, Rob C.W. Eken
Aansprakelijkheid: een teken van kwaliteit
Communicated by Prof.drs. G.G.M. Bak RA
695 Edwin R. van Dam, Willem H. Haemers
A characterization of distance-regular graphs with diameter three
Communicated by Prof.dr. M.H.C. Paardekooperii
696 Paul Smit
Generating Identical Ritz Values
Cummunicated by Prof.dr. M.H.C. Paardekooper
697 Antoon van den Elzen
An adjustment process for the standard ArrowlDebreu model with production
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
698 B. Kamp
Study regarding the structural discount of the price of Elsevier stock compared to
the price of Reed stock
Communicated by Drs. P.J.W. Duffhues
699 Edwin R. van Dam
Bounds on separated pairs of subgraphs, eigenvalues and related polynomials
Communicated by Dr.ir. W.H. Haemers
700 Jelmer Boersma en Chris Veld
Het gebruik van financiele derivaten door grote Nederlandse ondernemingen
Communicated by Prof.dr. P.W. Moerland
701 Ad H.J.J. Kolnaar en Pieter J.F.G. Meulendijks
Zijn Cobbenhagen's ideeën opnieuw aktueel?
Communicated by Prof.dr. Th. van de Klundert
702 C.L.J.P. van Raalte en H.M. Webers
Spatial competition with intermediated matching
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
703 Herbert Hamers en Marco Slikker
The PEGS-rule for probabilistic sequencing situations
Communicated by Prof.dr. S. Tijs
704 Nick van der Lijn
Measuring well-being with social indicators, HDIS, PQLI, and BWI for 133 countries
for 1975, 1980, 1985, 1988 en 1992
Communicated by Prof.dr. J. James
705 Nick van der Lijn
Well-being, democracy, and the economic system: an empirical analysis
Communicated by Prof.dr. J. James
706 Jack P.C. Kleijnen
Sensitivity Analysis and Related Analyses: a Survey of Statistical Techniques
Communicated by Dr.ing. W.J.H. van Groenendaal
707 Aldo de Moor
The Development of a Research Network Information System Specification
Method
Communicated by Prof.dr. R.A. Meersmaniii
708 J.J.A. Moors, M.H. Schuld and A.C.A. Mathijssen
A new method for assessing judgmental distributions
Communicated by Prof.dr. B.B. van der Genugten
709 Laurence van Lent
Onderzoek op het gebied van de externe verslaggeving
Communicated by Prof.drs. G.G.M. Bak
710 Josien van Cappelle-Konijnenberg
Restructuring, firm performance and control mechanisms
Communicated by Drs. P.J.W. Duffhues
71 1 B.B. van der Genugten
Blackjack in Holland Casino's: basic, optimal and winning strategies
Communicated by Dr. A.M.B. De Waegenaere
712 Prof.dr. F.W. Vlotman
Het vragen naar Toegevoegde Waarde
Communicated by Prof.dr.mr. P.M. v.d. Zanden RAIV
IN 1996 REEDS VERSCHENEN
713 Jeroen Suijs en Peter Borm
Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs: deterministic equivalents
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
714 Herbert Hamers
Generalized Sequencing Games
Communicated by Prof.dr. S.H. Tijs
715 Ursula Glunk en Celeste P.M. Wilderom
Organizational Effectiveness - Corporate Performance?
Why and How Two Research Traditions Need to be Merged
Communicated by Prof.dr. S.W. Douma
716 R.B. Bapat en Stef Tijs
Incidence Matrix Games
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
717 J.J.A. Moors, R. Smeets en F.W.M. Boekema
Sampling with probabilities proportional to the variable of interest
Communicated by Prof.dr. B.B. van der Genugten
718 Harry Webers
The Location Model with Reservation Prices
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
719 Harry Webers
On the Existence of Unique Equilibria in Location Models
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
720 Henk Norde en Stef Tijs
Determinateness of Strategic Games with a Potential
Communicated by Prof.dr. A.J.J. Talman
721 Peter Borm and Ben van der Genugten
On a measure of skill for games with chance elements
Communicated by Prof.dr. E.E.C. van Damme
722 Drs. C.J.C. Ermans RA and Drs. G.W. Hop RA
Financial Disclosure: A Closer Look
Communicated by Prof.drs. G.G.M. Bak RA
723 Edwin R. van Dam 81 Edward Spence
Small regular graphs with four eigenvalues
Communicated by Dr.ir. W.H. Haemers
724 Paul Smit
Inexact Iterations for the Approximation of Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors
Communicated by Prof.dr. M.H.C. PaardekooperV
725 Tammo H.A. Bijmolt, Michel Wedel
A Monte Carlo Evaluation of Maximum Likelihood Multidimensional Scaling
Methods
Communicated by Prof.dr. R. Pieters
726 J.C. Engwerda
On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.M. Schumacher
727 Jacob C. Engwerda en Rudy C. Douven
A game-theoretic rationale for EMU
Communicated by Prof.dr. J.E.J. Plasmans
728 Willem H. Haemers
Disconnected vertex sets and equidistant code pairs
Communicated by Prof.dr. S. Tijs
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